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LAURENCE M. JONES AS A PROPERTY TEACHER
Russell R. Reno*
In June of 1978, Professor Laurence M. Jones retired after forty-
three years as a Professor of Law, the last thirty-six of which he
spent at the University of Maryland. Laurence Jones grew up in
Clear Lake, Iowa, where his father was a practicing attorney, and
attended the University of Iowa, from which he received his B.A.
degree. Upon graduation he entered the university's college of law
and received a J.D. degree from the University of Iowa in 1932. At
that time the J.D. degree was not awarded to all law school
graduates but was reserved for honor graduates. While Laurence
Jones was a law student, he worked under Professor Percy Bordwell,
who was one of the outstanding scholars and teachers in the field of
real property of his time. In this close association with Professor
Bordwell, Laurence Jones developed his lifelong interest in the
property field. After he was admitted to the Iowa Bar, Laurence
Jones decided to further his legal education with two years of
graduate study at the Harvard Law School, from which he received
his master's degree in 1933 and his S.J.D. degree in 1934. During his
summers, and for a year after he completed his graduate studies, he
practiced law with his father, but he had already decided that his
main objective in life would be to teach law. His decision came
during the worst part of the Depression, when law schools were not
adding any new members to their faculties, but it was not long
before he received an offer from the Lamar School of Law of Emory
University. He welcomed this opportunity to begin his teaching
career at one of the leading law schools in the South, joining its
faculty as assistant professor in 1935.
During the next six years Professor Jones taught the property
courses at Emory and participated in the activities of the Georgia
Bar Association. In 1941, with the decrease in law student
enrollment caused by the military draft, he took a year's leave of
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absence to serve as Visiting Associate Professor at the University of
Missouri. When this writer was called to active duty as a reserve
officer in June of 1942, Professor Jones joined our faculty as Visiting
Associate Professor and took over the teaching of all of the property
courses. When the war caused the size of the faculty to be reduced
even further, Professor Jones added the torts and insurance courses
to his teaching load. The end of the war not only brought the return
of this writer from the service in January 1946, but it also caused a
sudden influx of war veterans to the Law School. That year
Professor Jones became a permanent member of the University of
Maryland faculty with the rank of professor. From 1946 until the
retirement of this writer in 1974, we divided the teaching of the
property courses at Maryland. We both taught first year property
classes, but Professor Jones taught the advanced courses in the field
of future interests and trusts and estates while this writer taught
those on real estate transactions and land use planning. During the
years we taught first year property courses together, we were in
complete agreement both on the scope of the course, with its
emphasis upon the history of the development of real property law,
and on the necessity for incisive analysis and the use of correct legal
terminology in the study of property law. Although we had different
opinions concerning the sequence of the development of the basic
property topics, all of our students entered the advanced property
courses with the same background and understanding of the
fundamental property concepts.
During his thirty-six years on our faculty, Professor Jones did
not confine his legal talents to the classroom; he took an active part
in the work of the Maryland Bar Association. During the sixties he
acted as a consultant to a special legislative commission which was
appointed to revise the testamentary laws of Maryland and was a
member of the Bar Association special legislative commission that
drafted the Limitations on Rights of Entry and Possibilities of
Reverter Act. When the Maryland Bar Association was reorganized
into sections, Professor Jones became an active member of the
Trusts and Estates Section, and continues to serve on its council.
Professor Jones also took an active part in the internal operation
of the Law School and the University. He served on numerous Law
School committees, including the curriculum committee, which he
chaired for many years. After the University Senate was created,
Professor Jones served as one of the Law School representatives to
that faculty organization and for many years sat on its executive
committee. As a member of the University's committee on tenure, he
was the principal draftsman of the university faculty contract,
which established the tenure rules of the University.
[VOL. 38
PROPERTY TEACHER
Although he was highly regarded as a property professor,
Professor Jones did not always concentrate on property law in his
scholarly pursuits. Before he became engrossed in teaching property
courses at Emory University, Professor Jones wrote and published
two articles examining the problems state legislators encounter in
preparing legislation in conformance with state or federal constitu-
tional provisions. The first article, Constitutional Provisions
Regulating the Mechanics of Enactment in Iowa,1 dealt with the
mechanical details that an Iowa statute had to satisfy before it could
become a valid legislative enactment. In his second article, Some
Constitutional Limitations on State Sales Taxes,2 Professor Jones
discussed the substantive issue of when a state can subject retail
sales to a state sales tax without offending the United States
Constitution. In 1936, when this article was published, taxation of
retail sales was a very important issue; states were in need of a new
source of revenue to supplement the property tax, and a retail sales
tax was the most likely source. In his analysis of the constitutional
restrictions placed upon a state's power to tax retail sales, Professor
Jones classified the various taxable sales in three groups: foreign
sales, sales taxed by the state of origin of the goods, and sales taxed
by the state of destination. As the article pointed out, the
constitutional prohibition against levying any imposts or duty on
imports and exports applies only to merchandise received from a
foreign country and then only if it remains in the original package.
Once such a package was broken and the goods incorporated into
the general stream of state commerce, they could be taxed. In
contrast to the sale of foreign goods, the sale of merchandise
between states raised a most important problem of whether
imposing a sales tax on the transaction placed a burden on
interstate commerce and was thus prohibited under the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution. Professor Jones reasoned
that the constitutionality of any retail sales tax on a transaction
depended on whether the tax was being levied by the state of the
goods' origin or the state of destination, and concluded that a state's
imposition of a retail sales tax on goods that were within the state,
but which were being sold to an out-of-state buyer, would be
unconstitutional. He also concluded that it would be an unconstitu-
tional regulation of commerce for the state of destination to tax
goods which, at the time of the sale, were outside the state. In sum,
Professor Jones concluded that the merchandise had to pass through
1. 21 IOWA L. REV. 79 (1935).
2. 20 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1936).
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the hands of a local merchant before a valid retail sales tax could be
imposed. Furthermore, he pointed out that these limitations on the
scope of the taxation of retail sales could not be avoided by casting
the tax in the form of an occupational tax rather than a sales tax; no
such tax on the value of merchandise passing in interstate commerce
could be imposed.
After Professor Jones became enmeshed in the intricacies of his
Future Interests courses, the focus of most of his articles shifted to
the field of real property law. Two of the most fascinating problems
that arise in connection with future interests are the determination
of whether a particular interest is vested or contingent and the
application of the Rule against Perpetuities, particularly its
application to powers of appointment. Professor Jones dealt with
these topics in articles written between 1943 and 1962. His article
entitled Vested and Contingent Remainders, a Suggestion With
Respect to Legal Method3 examined the traditional manner in which
most courts analyze remainder issues. Professor Jones pointed out
that courts often begin analysis of such problems by classifying the
remainder as either vested or contingent, and demonstrated that
courts employing this distinction in this manner often used it to
solve problems unrelated to vested or contingent characteristics,
whether the remainder was alienable or not, whether it was
descendible or devisable, and whether or not the Rule against
Perpetuities applied to it. After demonstrating that the application
of the traditional vested-contingent distinction served only to
confuse that area of property law to the point where neither the
courts nor the lawyers could "predict with any degree of accuracy
what [would] be the result in the next case," he suggested that the
courts abandon this rigid approach to remainders and analyze each
case separately in order to determine the exact nature of the
remainder problem involved without a preliminary reference to
whether the remainder is vested or contingent.
While he was teaching at the University of Maryland, Professor
Jones devoted three articles to some of the thornier problems
generated by the Rule against Perpetuitites. Two of these articles
dealt with the application of the rule to powers of appointment. In
the first, The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers of
Appointment in Maryland,4 he wrote a critique of the man-
ner in which the Maryland Court of Appeals had applied the
rule to powers of appointment, analyzing several areas in which
Maryland courts had departed from the generally followed, well-
3. 8 MD. L. REv. 1 (1943).
4. 18 MD. L. REV. 93 (1958).
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settled rules. He noted, for example, that in Maryland the general
power to appoint the property of a trust is in fact limited, in that the
trust donee cannot appoint the property to himself, his creditors, his
estate or the creditors of his estate, but that the Maryland courts had
ignored this limitation.
In his second article on this subject, The Rule Against
Perpetuities and Powers of Appointment: An Old Controversy
Revived,5 Professor Jones challenged the propriety of the accepted
approach to validating powers of appointment, which requires that
such appointments be exercised within a period encompassing a life
in being, plus 21 years, from the time of its creation. Professor Jones
concluded that it would be more in keeping with the real purposes of
the rule - to promote free alienability of property and to prevent
excessive control by past generations - to measure the rule period
from the moment of the donee's death, the time at which the power is
exercised.
Professor Jones' third article, Reforming the Law - The Rule
Against Perpetuities,6 discussed the common law approach to the
rule and analyzed Maryland's statutory modification - adopting the
"wait and see" doctrine - of the common law rule. Under this 1960
statute the validity of the property interest is determined on the
basis of the facts existing at the termination of the life estate. In his
article, Professor Jones weighed the drawbacks of this legislation
against the benefit of imposing a limit on the time period during
which the deceased donee may control the property, muting his
praise of the statute with insightful suggestions for its improvement.
Professor Jones has also written on two personal property
questions which are covered in the first year property course and
which can always be counted on to create excellent discussion by the
students; they are who bears the loss of a theft or damage to an
automobile in a pay parking lot and who is entitled to the proceeds
of a joint bank account when the depositor dies. In 1938, courts were
beginning to hear cases on the issue of liability for damages to cars
left in pay parking lots. In his article entitled The Parking Lot
Cases, Professor Jones analyzed the few cases that existed at that
time and pointed out that "[m]ost of the difficulties [with these cases
had] arisen from an attempt to apply settled principles of law to a
new problem, from an attempt to apply an old rule to a new case."
He noted further that the courts had classified these parking lot
cases into two types. In cases in which an attendant had merely
5. 54 IOWA L. REV. 456 (1968).
6. 22 MD. L. REV. 269 (1962).
7. 27 GEo. L.J. 162 (1938).
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collected the fee and designated the parking area, the courts found
the relationship to be merely that of licensor-licensee and relieved
the lot operator of liability. On the other hand, when an attendant
had exercised complete or substantial control over the automobile,
the courts used the bailor-bailee relationship to create a prima facie
case of negligence on the part of the lot operator.
The relationship between owners of a joint bank account where
one party is the sole depositor of money in the account is often of
interest both to married law students, who usually have joint
accounts with their spouses, and to single students, who often share
joint accounts with a parent or parents. In an article entitled The
Use of Joint Bank Accounts as a Substitute for Testamentary
Disposition of Property,8 Professor Jones reviewed the five theories
that have been applied by courts to uphold the survivor's right to the
entire balance in a joint bank account upon death of the depositor
and determined that the testamentary, gift, trust, contract and
cotenancy theories all failed to express satisfactorily the depositor's
intent to retain complete control over the property until his death
and to specify who will receive it upon the depositor's death. In
conclusion, Professor Jones suggested that, in this context, joint
accounts be recognized for what they are: testamentary dispositions
of property without wills.
A problem similar to the joint bank account situation arose
during World War II when newly issued War Savings Bonds were
registered under two names. These bonds were completely controlled
by Treasury regulations; they were issued under special statutory
provisions and were not subject to common law doctrines of joint
ownership. When, in 1950, many questions arose with respect to the
transferability and taxation of, and rights of the survivor in, these
bonds, Professor Jones prepared an article for the Maryland Law
Review,9 explaining their ownership and taxation characteristics,
and the rights of creditors and survivors under the applicable
Treasury regulations.
Throughout his entire teaching career Professor Jones retained
an interest in a field of the law unrelated to property which always
intrigued him. This was the field of insurance law. On several
occasions he taught the course on insurance both at Emory and at
Maryland. In 1960, when the use of variable annuities first came
into prominence, he couldn't resist the temptation to take a fling into
the insurance field by publishing an article entitled A Discussion
8. 17 U. PiTT. L. REv. 42 (1955).
9. United States Savings Bonds, Series E, F, and G, 11 MD. L. REv. 265 (1950).
[VOL. 38
PROPERTY TEACHER
and Analysis of the Valic Decision.10 In Valic, the United States
Supreme Court dealt with the immediate problem of whether an
owner of a variable annuity had to comply with the terms of the
Securities and Investment Companies acts and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The Court held that because
the amount of a variable annuity was based upon the investment
earnings of the insurance company these annuities were subject to
the regulations of the SEC in the same manner as mutual
investment funds. This article discussed the broad policy aspect of
the case: whether the insurance companies issuing variable
annuities should be subject to regulation by SEC or left solely to the
control of the state insurance commissions. After discussing the
business of insurance, the regulation of insurance companies, the
nature and regulation of the investment business in general,
variable annuities and the Valic decision, Professor Jones concluded
that the issue remained open and that Congress should reexamine
the problem.
During his final year of teaching, Professor Jones again turned
to the field of personal property and published an article on
Corroborating Evidence as a Substitute for Delivery in Gifts of
Chattels.1' In this article he addressed the question of what
corroborating evidence in support of an oral gift is sufficient to
justify an exception to the traditional rule that there must be a
physical transfer of possession of a chattel in order to effectuate a
valid gift. After analyzing the cases in which gifts had been
sustained without a physical delivery of the chattel, Professor Jones
concluded that the true measure of whether an oral gift is valid
should be the sufficiency of evidence corroborating the donative
intent evidenced by the oral words of gift. In Professor Jones'
opinion, this approach to validating oral gifts should not be treated
as a mere exception to the manual delivery requirement because it
itself establishes a suitable standard by which to test the evidence
necessary to establish the gift claim.
With Professor Jones' retirement the Law School has lost a
dedicated teacher who devoted his entire time to working with his
students both in the classroom and in his office, and who
contributed through his publications to the clarification and the
improvement of the law. It is the hope of both his colleagues and the
legal profession that he will continue his work with the Trust and
Estate Section of the Maryland State Bar Association.
10. 5 VILL. L. REV. 407 (1960).
11. 12 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 16 (1978).
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